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FRANKS V. DELAWARE: A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Franks v. 1Jelaware 1 the United States Supreme Court extended
the reach of the exclusionary rule 2 to h_o ld that a criminal defendant
may, under certain circumstances, challenge the· veracity of factual allegations made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 3 Resolving
an issue which had caused considerable conflict among the states4 and,
to a lesser extent, among federal courts, 5 the Court emphasized the
fourth amendment's guarantee that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
" 6 The "Oath
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation .
I. 438 u.s. 154 (1978).
2. Applicable in both federal, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and state, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), courts, the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The exclusionary rationale has been extended to
violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel in Massiah v. United States, 377 U .S. 201
(1964) (confessions) and in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v.·Califomia,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (line up and subsequent in-court identificatiun).
3. 438 U.S. at 156.
4. Appendix B to the Franks opinion (438 U.S. 154, 176-80 app. (1978)) lists those states
which permitted a veracity challenge prior to Franks; those which permitted veracity challenges as
dictated by statute; those states whose position on the issue was doubtful, but seemed to allow
veracity challenges; those states which have disposed of particular veracity challenges on the
ground that the warrant affidavits were in fact not false, or that any misstatements were immaterial, unintentional or not made by the affiant himself; those states which flatly prohibited veracity
challenges; and, finally, the two states (Missouri and Rhode Island) which prohibited challenges
that were directed seemingly against the conclusory nature of the affidavits, ~ather than their veracity.
5. Prior to Franks, the United States circuit courts of appeals almost unanimously allowed
a defendant to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit. See United States v. Armocida, 515
F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. Gazel v. United States, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States
v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1975); United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d
4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U .S. 965 (1976); United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st
Cir. 1974); United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart, 492
F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983
(7th Cir. 1973) (en bane); United States v. Thorn~. 489 F .2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 423
U.S. 844 (1975); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (lOth Cir. 1972); United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970). Only the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not permit challenges to affiant veracity.
See United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Watts, 540 F.Zd 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, a valid arrest warrant or search warrant may only issue upon an affidavit or complaint
which sets forth facts establishing probable -cause.
The function of the probable cause requirement in the search warrant context:
is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be
justified by discovery of offending items. Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the
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or affirmation" requirement, reasoned the Franks Court, is intended to
ensure the truthfulness of the allegations which comprise the assertion
of probable cause. 7
After discussing the Franks opinion and conflicting pre- Franks
case law, this comment evaluates the standards established by the
Franks Court to be applied by lower courts in ruling on a defendant's
request for a veracity hearing. The comment proposes a practical application of the Franks standard which allows the defendant to challenge suspect affidavits without delaying the judicial process and
harassing the police with frivolous claims of falsification. The comment then explores the parameters of a question expressly left unresolved by the Franks opinion: whether, and what circumstances, a
reviewing court must require the revelation of an informant's identity
once the defendant has shown the need for a veracity hearing. 8 Finally,
the comment reviews the pertinent considerations and proposes a
method for accommodating the conflicting interests between protecting
the secrecy of the informant's identity and exposing affiant falsification.9
II.

A.

BALANCING SOCIETAL COSTS

The Facts of Franks v. Delaware

Jerome Franks was convicted of rape, kidnapping and burglary
after Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police that a man with a knife had sexu-ally assaulted her in her home. She described the rapist's physical
characteristics and stated that he was wearing a white thermal underwarrant must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable
by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the
place to be searched . . . . (T]he right of arrest arises only when a crime is committed or
attempted in the presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has "reasonable grounds
to believe"-sometimes stated "probable cause to believe"~at a felony has been commit·
ted by the person to be arrested.
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on The Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
CHI. L. REV . 664, 687 (1961).
The Supreme Court has offered this formulation of probable cause: "(p]robable cause exists
if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the
offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). See GiordeneUo v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948);
Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923); Stacy v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1978).
7. 438 U.S. at 164.
8. /d. at 170.
9. This comment does not consider the difficult issue of whether a veracity hearing ought as
a matter of fourth amendment policy to be required whenever a warrant affidavit contains a deliberate falsehood even if probable cause would still exist once the false statement is excised from the
warrant, and the falsity is not material to the probable cause assertion. On that issue compare
United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976); United States
v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); and State
v. Goodlow, 11 Wash. App. 533, 523 P.2d 1024 (1974) with State v. Payne, 25 Ariz. App. 454, 544
P.2d 671 (1976); Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1969) and
People v. Staffney, 70 Mich. App. 737, 246 N .W.2d 364 (1976). See generally Kipperman, Jnaccu-,.ate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Groundfor Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 825 (1971).
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shirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather coat, and
a dark knit cap. Coincidentally, on the day Mrs. Bailey reported the
rape, police took defendant Franks into custody for assaulting a fifteen
year old girl. While awaiting his bail hearing, the defendant told the
youth officer accompanying him that he was surprised that the bail
hearing was about the fifteen year old girl. The defendant remarked "I
thought you said Bailey. I don't know her." 10
The next day the youth officer mentioned the defendant's comments to the detective working on the Bailey case. The detective submitted a sworn affidavit 11 to the justice of the peace in support of a
warrant to search the defendant's apartment. The warrant affidavit described the police's desire to confirm that the defendant's mode of dress
matched that of the person who attacked Mrs. Bailey. In addition, the
affidavit asserted that the affiant had spoken to James Morrison and
Wesley Lucas, fellow employees of the defendant. As alleged in the
affidavit, these men had described the defendant's normal dress as consisting of a white thermal undershirt, a brown leather jacket, and a knit
hat. Acting upon the warrant, police found a white thermal undershirt,
a knit hat, dark pants, a leather jacket, and a single bladed knife in the
defendant's apartment. At trial, the state offered those items into evidence.
At the suppression hearing defendant's counsel had asserted that
Lucas and Morrison would testify that the warrant affiant had not interviewed them. In addition, the defense counsel argued, although
Frank's fellow employees had spoken to a police officer, the information they had given him was "somewhat different" from that reported
in the affidavit. Defendant's counsel asserted that the affiant had purposely and in "bad faith" included the misrepresentations in his warrant affidavit. 12 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, 13 and
he lost his appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 14
In reversing Franks's conviction, the Supreme Court announced
the conditions under which a defendant's challenge to the warrant affidavit is sufficient to entitle the defendant to a veracity hearing. Under
the rule of Franks, if the defendant makes a "substantial preliminary
showing" 15 that the warrant affidavit contained a false statement made
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
and if the allegedly false statement was crucial to the finding of probable cause, the court must conduct a veracity hearing to assess the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit. At the
10. 438 U.S. at 156. Evidently, the name of the youth whom Franks was accused of having
assaulted sounded similar to Bailey.
II. The Court appended the affidavit to the Franks opinion. 438 U.S. at 172.
12. /d. at 158.
13. /d. at 160.
14. Franks v. State, 373 A.2d 578 (Del. Super., 1977).
15. 438 U.S. at 155.
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veracity hearing, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the false statement was the product of the affiant's
perjury or reckless disregard 16 and that the deletion of the false statement renders the affidavit insuffi~ient to establish probable cause. 17 If
the defendant can satisfy both burdens, the Court's holding in Franks
requires the trial judge to void the search warrant and to exclude the
fruits of the search from the evidence to be offered at trial. 18
Case law which had evolved in the state and lower federal courts
prior to Franks essentially had articulated three different rules. Some
courts had held that a defendant had no right to a hearing to ascertain
the truth of the affiant's assertions contained in a facially sufficient
search warrant. 19 California courts had pursued a second approach
and concluded that a defendant had a right to a hearing if the affidavit
in support of the search warrant contained any negligent misrepresentations, regardless of the affiant's good faith.2° Finally, the Seventh
Circuit, adopting a third position, held that a defendant had a right to a
veracity hearing only if misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit were
the product of the affiant's bad faith. 21 After Franks, only the second
and third approaches remain viable.
B.
1.

The Pre-Franks Rules

Theodor v. Superior Court

In Theodor v. Superior Court, 22 the California Supreme Court concluded that the allegation that the affidavit was based on an unreasonable but good faith misrepresentation entitled the defendant to a
veracity hearing. 23 If the challenged assertion in the affidavit is reasonable and was made in good faith, the Theodor court stated, the warrant
16. In the Court's view, and therefore for purposes of this comment, perjury and reckless
disregard for the truth are synonymous so far as the integrity of the fourth amendment is concerned. The Court does not distinguish between those two impositions on the amendment.
17. 438 U.S. at 156.
18. Id.
19. Liberto v. State, 248 Ark. 350,356-57, 451 S.W.2d 464,468 (1970); State v. Williams, 169
Conn. 322, 327-29, 363 A.2d 72, 76-77 (1975); People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144-46, 258 N.E.2d
341, 343-44, cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 467-68, 497 P.2d 275,
287 (1972); Caslin v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1973); Dawson v. State, II Md.
App. 694,713-15, 276 A.2d 680, 690-91 (1971); Wood v. State, 322 So. 2d 462, 465 (Miss. 1975);
State v. Petillo, 61 N .J. 165, 173-79, 293 A.2d 649, 653-56 (1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1 973);
Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 697 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 553, 399
S.W.2d 507, 511 (1965); Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
20. See, e.g., Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 17, 90, 100-01, 501 P.2d 234, 243, 251, 104
Cal. Rptr. 226, 235, 243 (1972) (en bane). See text accompanying notes 22-38 infra.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane). See text
accompanying notes 39-54 infra.
22. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972). The
Theodor court cited Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 622, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223,
230 ( 1969): "Good faith . . . is immaterial, and cannot serve to rehabilitate an otherwise defective
warrant." 8 Cal. 3d at 98 n.l3, 501 P.2d at 249 n.13, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n.l3.
23. 8 Cal 3d at 97, 501 P.2d at 248-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
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is unassailable. If, however, the assertion was made in good faith but is
unreasonable, or if the assertion was made in bad faith, Theodor required the trial judge to invalidate the warrant. 24
The Theodor rationale may be analogized to the focus of two leading Supreme Court cases which developed the rule of reasonableness
for cases involving warrantless arrests and searches. 25 In Henry v.
United States, 26 the Supreme Court conceded that although the quantum of evidence required to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt exceeds that necessary to support a finding of probable
cause, the police officer's good faith belief that probable cause exists
will not of itself establish its existence.27 In Henry, federal officers
made a warrantless arrest and conducted a warrantless search incident
to the arrest. Investigating a theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey, the. officers twice observed the defendant placing cartons in a car
in a residential area. Upon arresting the defendant and searching the
car, the officers found and seized cartons containing radios stolen from
an interstate shipment. 28 The Supreme Court determined that on the
facts of the case, the officers did not have sufficient probable cause for
the arrest when they stopped the car. The Court stated that "[p]robable
cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant
a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. " 29
The mere fact that in Henry the officer in good faith believed that an
offense had been committed was not sufficient to satisfy the fourth
amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. 30
The Theodor court cited Beck v. Ohio 31 in which the Supreme
Court reiterated the principles of Henry. In Beck, police officers had
received unspecified "information" and "reports" about the defendant.
The officers knew what the defendant looked like and knew that he had
a gambling record. They stopped the defendant while he was driving
his car, placed him under arrest and searched the car without obtaining
either a search or arrest warrant. After the search at the scene proved
fruitless, the officers took the defendant to the police station where an
24. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. See also United States v. Perry,
380 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Poppit, 227 F. Supp. 73, 77, 78 (D. Del. 1964).
25. The Supreme Court of California reasoned that "a mere good faith belief in the accuracy
of the facts contained in an affidavit is insufficient." The court then cited to Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 97 (1964), as support for the assertion that "this conclusion is in accord with established
search and seizure principles which declare that in assessing probable cause, good faith alone is
insufficient." 8 Cal. 3d at 98 n.l3, 501 P.2d at 49 n. l3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n. l3. Beck quoted
Henry v. United States: "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough." 361 U.S.
98, 102 (1959). Therefore, the foregoing evaluation of the Theodor rationale examines the applicability of the Beck and Henry "search and seizure principles" to the issue confronted in Franks.
26. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
27. ld. at 1_02.
28. ld. at 99-100.
29. Jd. at 102.
30. Jd.
31. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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in-custody search revealed clearing house slips on the defendant's person.32 The Beck Court reasoned that if the police officer's subjective
good faith belief in the existence of probable cause would alone establish its existence, only at the discretion of the police would the people
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."33
The Theodor court adopted the position that if a mere good faith
belief on the part of the police officer that probable cause exists in the
warrantless search and seizure situation is insufficient to establish probable cause, the good faith of the warrant affiant should not insulate the
warrant from a veracity hearing. 34 Several commentators,35 including
some of those cited in the Franks opinion, 36 have embraced the logic of
the analogy suggested by the Theodor court. They have noted that
good faith errors in supporting affidavits can be so critically in~ccurate
as to destroy probable cause. 37 They argue that the assertion that a
negligent misrepresentation contained in a warrant affidavit was made
in good faith should no more preclude a challenge to the warrant at a
veracity hearing than the officer's good faith belief in the legality of a
search legitimates an otherwise illegal search. 38
2

Carmichael v. United States

The Seventh Circuit, in Carmichael v. United States, 39 articulated
a more stringent standard than that embodied in the Theodor court's
rule. Judge Cummings, speaking for the circuit en bane, concluded
that a court should not suppress evidence unless the reviewing judge
finds that the officer was either intentionally or recklessly untruthful. 40
The Seventh Circuit found that a merely negligent misrepresentation,
assailable under Theodor, should not be a basis for quashing a warrant
at a veracity hearing.41 The Carmichael court cited two bases for its
conclusion. First, the court noted, the exclusionary rule's primary goal
32. /d. at 90.
33. /d. at 97, quoting U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See also United States v. Henderson, 17
F.R.D. I, 2 ( 1954). In this case of mistaken identity, the court found it incongruous "to give the
same effect to mistaken facts as to correct facts," simply because the police officer honestly believed that the defendant was the same person previously convicted. In Tehan v. United States ex
rei. Shott, 382 U .S. 406 ( 1966), the Court asserted that if the courts accept the basic postulate that
the goal of the trial is to determine the truth, then the mere good faith of police officers will not
suffice in place of the truth.
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. See text accompanying notes 1415 supra.
35. See, e.g. , Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavitsfor Search Warrants: Piercing
the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970). The author cites Henry and Beck at 13, n.22.
36. See sources cited 438 U.S. at 168, n.7.
37. Mascolo, supra note 35, at 13.
38. See, e.g., Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 1974 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
839, 848. But see Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, _156 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane).
40. Id. at 988.
41. /d.
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is to deter police misconduct; good faith errors, however, cannot be
deterred.42 Although the Carmichael court conceded that negligent
misrepresentations are theoretically deterrable, it concluded that no
feasible test existed for determining whether an officer was negligent or
entirely innocent in not checking his facts more thoroughly before applying for a warrant. 43 In addition, the court stated, if the innocent
misrepresentation is based on the police officer's reasonable belief, the
misrepresentation does not negate probable cause or make the search
unconstitutionally unreasonable. 44 The fourth amendment protects the
people's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures; 45 if, therefore, the officer has a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause, the fourth amendment's integrity is maintained.

C

The Franks Analysis

The Supreme Court decided Franks v. Delaware against this analytical background. The majority as well as the dissenting opinion
noted the competing values46 which necessarily lead to the imposition
of limitations on the right to attack affiant veracity in regard to a
facially sufficient warrant.47 Before defining the scope of its rule, however, the Franks Court responded to each of six arguments offered by
the State to support its contention tliat veracity challenges were improper. First, the State of Delaware argued that application of the exclusionary rule to yet another end--deterrence of affiant perjurywould exact too great a societal cost.48 The Court conceded it had been
reluctant to extend the exclusionary rule to "collateral areas, such as
civil or grand jury proceedings;"49 the rule's application to situations in
which the fourth amendment violation had been substantial and deliberate, however, has gone unquestioned. In the Court's view, until a
more desirable alternative surfaces, the exclusionary rule remains the
42. /d.
43. /d. at 989.
44. ld
45. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See notes 6 supra & 76 infra.
46. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Chief Justice. Burger, argued that, on balance, the
interests which mitigate against-veracity hearings (expediency, reluctance to extend exclusionary
rule) outweigh those relied upon by the majority. The dissent concluded that "ingenious lawyers"
wiD use the veracity hearing as one more means of burdening the criminal dO<:ket. 438 U.S. 18187. Regarding the balancing of conflicting interests which are pertinent to fourth amendment
inquiry see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 354 ( 1974);
Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U.
ILL. L. F. 655, 658.
47. 438 U.S. at 167.
48. /d. at 166.
49. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (permitting use of evidence obtained in.
violation of the fourth amendment in civil proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U .S. 338
( 1974) (permitting use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment before the grand
jury).
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most efficacious sanction yet devised. 50
The State's second argument asserted that application of the exclusionary rule to veracity attacks would "overlap" with existing perjury
penalties such as criminal prosecutions, departmental discipline for
misconduct, contempt of court, and civil actions.51 The Court easily
dispensed with this argument by noting that Mapp v. Ohio 52 had implicitly concluded that such alternatives were insufficient to uphold the
integrity of the fourth amendment. 53
Third, the State argued ~hat because the magistrate may inquire
into the veracity of an affidavit prior to issuance of the warrant, the
benefits of a post-search adversary proceeding are not worth the cost of
exclusion. 54 The Court responded that the ex parte nature of the presearch warrant issuance procedure will not always be sufficient to uncover perjurious affidavits. The Co_!!rt also observed that the pre-search
proceeding is often necessarily a hasty proceeding because the police
must act before the evidence disappears. 55
The Franks Court also rejected the State's fourth argument that a
post-search veracity hearing would denigrate the dignity of the magistrate's function. The less finaJ5 6 the magistrate realizes his determination is, the State contended, the less conscientiously he will make his
decisions. 57 Rejecting that argument, the Court noted that the need for
50. 438 U.S. at 171. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-20
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
Although I would hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed, the
history of the Suppression Doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective . . . . I do not propose . . . that we
abandon the Suppression Doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed.
But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring), in which the Chief Justice
was prepared to advocate the immediate abolition of the exclusionary rule: "[i]ncentives for developing new procedures or remedies will remain minimal or non-existent so long as the exclu. sionary rule is retained in its present form." 428 U.S. at 500. See also LaFave & Remington,
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63
MICH. L. REv. 987, 1003 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970).
51. 438 U.S. at 166.
52. 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
53. 438 U.S. at 169. The Court cited Justice Douglas's concurrence in Mapp in which he
quoted from Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949):
Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District
Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates bas ordered.
367 U.S. at 670.
54. 438 U.S. at 166 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. /d. at 169.
56. In regard to the finality issue, the dissent cited Justice Jackson's concurrence in Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), which spoke to the question of the finality of Supreme Court
decisions: "(R]eversal by a higher court is not proof justice is thereby better done . .. . We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." 438 U.S. at 186
(Rehnquist, J ., disse!!_ting).
57. 438 U.S. at 167. Confidence in the integrity of the warrant issuance procedure may be
misplaced. Sevilla, supra note 38, at 876. Some judges issue warrants without much concern for
whether probable cause has been established by the supporting affidavits. In such cases, serious
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a veracity hearing does not reflect the inherent abilities of the people
who are magistrates, but rather the inherent shortcomings of the ex
parte warrant issuance procedure. In addition, because the Franks decision only extends to instances of perjury or reckless disregard for the
truth, the magistrate still has a "broad field" in which to act as the sole
safeguard of fourth amendment rights. 58
Fifth, the State argued that defendants and counsel would abuse
the veracity hearing, thereby further overloading the criminal dockets.59 The Court responded to this argument by imposing the "substantial preliminary showing" requisite. 60 Such a "sensible threshhold
showing" and "sensible substantive requirements for suppression," the.
Court thought, precluded the possibility of any great strain on the judiciary.61
Finally, the State contended that the post-search veracity hearing
is inappropriate because as a practical matter the affiant has little or no
control of the affidavit's veracity. Hearsay, fleeting observations, and
tips received from properly undisclosed informants62 may form the basis of the affidavit's probable cause assertion. 63 The Franks Court did
not expressly confront this final argument. The argument proves too
much, however, by implying that because probable cause may be derived from such sources, examination of affiant veracity is never desirareview of the legality of the search is not performed unti-l the suppression hearing at which the
defendant asserts that the police obtained the evidence in violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. LaFave & Remington, supra note 50, at 993. Professors LaFave and Remington also note that on occasion, when the actual case is tried before the judge who issued the search
warrant, that same judge may reverse himself and find that the search warrant was invalid because
the grounds upon which he issued the warrant were insufficient. /d. See also Wilson, How the
Police Chief Sees It, HARPER'S MAGAZINE 140, 143 (April 1964).
· Professor Grano asserts that the system in Philadelphia is not atypical. The police officer asks
the assistant district attorney to approve the warrant and that prosecutor grants his approval after
only a cursory reading. The officer then submits the warrant to a judge. The judge does not
question the officer about the basis of the warrant. He simply issues the warrant as long as it
seems facially sufficient "with nothing but the officer's uniform and oath attesting to the c~dibility
of the facts." Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel' Spinelli-Harris Search Warrams and the
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 415 (hereinafter cited as Grano]. But see L.
TIFFANY, D. MciNTYRE & D. RoTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRJME 119-21 (1967), suggesting that
magistrates do take their duty to review search warrant applications more seriously than they do
arrest warrant applications. Professor Grano also concedes that search warrant affidavits are at
least usually read, arrest warrants not always being afforded the same attention. Grano, supra, at
415. The cases nevertheless offer examples of magistrates frequently discharging their duties with
less than the desired dignity. See Note, Testing the Factual Basis For a Search Warran/, 61
CoLUM. L. REv. 1529, 1531 n.22 (1967). See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957).
58. 438 U.S. at 170.
59. /d. at 167.
60. /d. at 170.
61. /d. The Court noted that its decision in no way attempted to resolve the issue of whether
the identity of an informant must be disclosed once the "substantial preliminary showing" of
falsity is offered. The Court only went so far as to say that the "substantial preliminary showing"
standard negates the possibility of a veracity bearing for discovery purposes. /d.
62. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
63. 438 U.S. at 167.
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ble. Intentional falsification poses a serious threat to the integrity of
the fourth amendment regar_dless of whether the affiant is swearing to
what he saw or to what some informant told him. According to the
Court, the availability of a veracity hearing will vindicate the integrity
of the warrant issuance procedure when an affiant has included perjurious assertions in the warrant complaint. 64
On the facts which Franks presented, the Court determined that it
should not decide whether the defendant had made a sufficient proffer
to entitle him to a veracity hearing. Because the Delaware judge had
denied Franks's veracity challenge on the basis of its absolute rule barring veracity challenges,65 the record contained no determination
whether the defendant's challenge had met Franks's "substantial preliminary showing" standard. Thus, the Court remanded for a reconsideration of the facts in light of the test it had announced. 66
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that "the framing of suitable
rules to govern proffers in a matter properly left to the States," 67 provided that the state standards satisfy the tests announced in the Franks
opinion.68
In effect, the Franks Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's Carmichael rule as the minimum constitutional standard. By making this
choice, the Court elected not to mandate the availability of the veracity
hearing to permit challenges, cognizable under Theodor, to warrants
supported by unreasonable good faith misrepresentations. Before a
warrant must be quashed, Franks requires that the misrepresentation
be perjurious or so unreasonable as to be reckless.69 The Supreme
Court's decision still leaves a "broad field" 70 for the magistrate as the
principal safeguard of fourth amendment guarantees at the ex parte
issuance proceeding. When the police have been merely negligent, that
is merely unreasonable, in checking or recording the facts relevant to
the assertion of probable cause, the defendant has no federal constitutional right to a Franks veracity hearing.71 Such n~gligent inaccuracies, if they are to preclude a legal search, must be uncovered at the ex
parte warrant issuance proceeding.
State courts are free to adopt the more liberal Theodor approach72
to grant a veracity hearing even when the police have made a less than
reckless misrepresentation. The holding in Theodor, however, is incon/d. at 165.
/d. at 160.
66. On appeal from Franks's conviction, the Delaware Supreme Court had accepted what it
deemed to be the majority view recognizing the absolute rule barring veracity challenges. Franks
v. State, 373 A.2d 578 (Del. Super. 1977).
67. 438 U.S. at 172.
68. /d.
69. /d. at 171.
70. !d. at 170.
71. !d. at 171.
72. /d. at 172.
64.
65.
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sistent with the traditional conception of the exclusionary rule as representing a balance be!ween competing social values: deterrence of
police misconduct, on the one hand, and conviction of guilty persons,
on the other. Although under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio, 73 the
fourth amendment requires per se exclusion of all evidence seized in
direct violation of its commands, the Supreme Court had engaged in ad
hoc balancing to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule in other areas. 74 Applying this balancing to the area of veracity challenges, courts
should weigh the potential deterrent effect that these challenges would
have on unreasonable police behavior. Balanced against that interest is
the societal cost incurred by the exclusion of probative and admittedly
reliable evidence. The exclusionary rule may require that a judge withhold what would otherwise be a finding of probable cause because evidence illegally obtained- forms the basis of the warrant request. 75
Occasionally, however, the judge may find that the policeman by seizing evidence has not violated the spirit of the exclusionary rule because
he has acted reasonably and in good faith; 76 in this situation, the court
should not invalidate the warrant because the cost of excluding the evidence which forms the basis of the probable cause finding remains constant while no deterrence of police misconduct is achieved. The
Theodor court, however, failed to consider this balance; rather the
court solely considered the probable-cause requirement while ignoring
the fact that deterrence is impossible when the policeman acts in good
faith. The Theodor court analogized to a warrantless search case 77 in
support of its decision, but this analogy is a weak one. In the false
affidavit context the police officer does not have unbridled discretion to
make the probable cause determination. A magistrate passes on the
sufficiency of the evidence contained in the affidavit. 78 For this reason
the Franks Court determined that in the case in which the magistrate
has found probable cause based upon the officer's testimony, the exclusionary rule serves as a check only on the affiant's good faith. 79
73. 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
74. See text accompanying note 49 supra; if. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (balancing
approach to question of whether state prisoners may raise fourth amendment claims already litigated in state criminal proceedings on federal habeas corpus review); Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969) (balancing approach to question of retroactivity of fourth amendment guarantees); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S 165 (1969) (balancing approach to question of standing
to assert fourth amendment rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (balancing
approach to question of admissibility of tainted secondary evidence).
75. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
76. This was the idea developed in Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane). See
_ text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
·
77. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, SOl P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. The Theodor court cited Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr.
223 (1949). The Beck Court in tum cited Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See notes 22
and 25 supra.
78. 438 U.S. at 169-70. 79. This is an example of the balancing process which the Court espoused in Terry v. Ohio,
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THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY SHOWING

Franks requires that a defendant make a "substantial preliminary
showing" of affiant perjury or reckless disregard for the truth before he
is constitutionally entitled to a veracity hearing. 8° Commentators have
not agreed as to how great a burden the requirement imposes on a defendant.81 Professor Grano considers the burden to be significant, 82
while a Connecticut court determined that it was rather minimal. 83
The confusion is understandable in light of the Franks decision's failure to delineate clearly the elements of a "substantial preliminary
showing" and by the Court's express ruling that the standards must be
determined by state law.84 Whether a particular preliminary showing
is sufficiently "substantial" will depend on the circumstances of each
case; unfortunately, the nature of the issues appears to preclude a more
precise standard. 85
A.

uGood Faith'' of the Affiant

The Franks Court recognized the problem of intentional falsifica.;.
tion by warrant affiants, typically police officers. 86 The majority opinion established that the defendant, as a prerequisite to obtaining a
veracity hearing, must make "a substantial preliminary showing that a
false statement knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard
for the truth, was included in the warrant affidavit." 87 Reckless disregard for the truth is as great a violation of the fourth amendment as an
intentional falsification of the affidavit. 88 Therefore, a "substantial preliminary showing" of either entitles a defendant to a veracity hearing.
The defendant must show more, however, than that the affiant made a
good faith misrepresentation.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issues presented in
392 U.S. I ( 1968), in the stop and frisk context. See Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical
Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 658.
80. 438 U.S. at 155.
81. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 4.4 at 69 (1979). See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF ~RE·
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.3(11) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) which provides that "the
good faith of any testimony presented to the issuing authority and relied on to establish reasonable cause for issuance of the warrant" may be contested at a veracity hearing only "upon preliminary motion, supported by affidavit, setting forth substantial basis for questioning the good faith
of the testimony."
82. Grano, supra note 57, at 425-27.
83. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 309 A.2d 135 (1973).
84. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
85. This is unlike the Miranda situation, Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
involving criteria which are sufficiently precise to be applied in federal and state courts alike.
Franks requires, instead, a balancing process.
86. 438 U.S. at 168.
87. /d. at 155-56.
88. Because the Franks Court found that the warrant clause takes the affiant's good faith as
its premise, and recklessness indicates a lack of good faith, it inferred that both perjury and reckless disregard for the truth are coequal impositions on the fourth amendment. /d.
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Franks by noting that the warrant clause89 itself is premised on the
affiant's good faith. 90 The requirement that a warrant be supported by
"Oath or affirmation" presupposes that the factual showing offered to
comprise probable cause be "truJhful." 91 The facts recited· in the warrant affidavit must be truthful, however, only to the extent "that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true." 92 If the affiant does not in good faith believe what is put
forth in the warrant affidavit, or if the affiant unreasonably accepted
the truth of the assertions in the affidavit, seizure of items pursuant to
the warrant violates the fourth amendment.
The veracity hearing provides the defendant with the opportunity
to prove the affiant's bad faith or recklessness. Thus, the Franks veracity hearing essentially operates to provide a defendant with procedural
safeguards for fourth amendment rights beyond those available at the
pre-issuance stage. Although initial inspection of the warrant is
designed to ferret out all misrepresentations, be they the product of
both good faith or bad,93 the magistrate's review of the warrant is an ex
parte proceeding. The veracity hearing, in contrast, is an adversary
proceeding;94 from a procedural standpoint, therefore, it is more competent to uncover police perjury or reckless disregard for the truth. 95

B.

Police Peljury

Police perjury is prevalent.96 The pollee are often not adverse to
89. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See notes 6 and 33 supra.
90. 438 U.S. at 164.
91. Justice Black.mun quoted the analysis of Judge Frankel in United States v. Halsey, 257
F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), qffd, Docket No. 31,369 (2d Cir. 1967) (unreported):
"'[W)hen the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing to comprise 'probable cause,' the
obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing.'" 438 U .S. at 164-65.
92. /d. at 165.
93. The Franks veracity bearing only recognizes challenges to a warrant based on alleged
bad faith misrepresentations by the affiant.
94. 438 U .S. at 169.
95. /d.
96. See United States v. Hood & Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973); Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People
v. Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1972); People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270
N.E.2d 709, 321 N .Y.S.2d 884 (1971); People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194
(Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970); E.J. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 105 (1931); Grano, supra note 57;
Sevilla, supra note 38; Younger, Tlte Peljury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596-97 (1967); Note, Effect
ofMapp v. Oltio on Police Searclt & Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRos. 87 (1968); Comment, Police Peljury in Narcotics "J)ropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60
GEo. L.J . 507 ( 1971 ) .. q: United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1973) (Two of
the agents seemed quite willing to make false affidavits. One of them, confronted with facts indicating the falsity of his affidavit, did not admit it to be false, but merely "inconsistent." ); People v.
Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 875, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327, 335 (1972) (citing trial judge in Carter's
PENAL CoDE§ 1538.5 hearing: "I am not too impressed by officer Barfield anyway. I think that if
he hadn't been a police officer . . . I would have referred him to the District Attorney for an
investigation as to perjury .. .."); People v. Dickerson, 273 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650, 78 Cal. Rptr.
400, 403 ( 1969) (natural desire of police officer may cause him to be less than candid in regard to
the_collateral inquiry which does not go to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence). See also J .
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engaging in perjurious conduct to salvage a conviction.97 An officer
with no flair for perjury could easily fabricate a search warrant that
would satisfy a magistrate and pass constitutional muster. 98 In Franks,
the Court sought to curb police perjury by requiring that the defendant
receive a veracity hearing when he has made a "substantial preliminary
showing" of police perjury. 99 Logically, Franks will be an effective
check on police perjury only if the courts apply the preliminary showing standard in a manner consistent with the Franks objective: the exposure and deterrence of perjury and reckless disregard for the truth on
the part of law enforcement officials. The courts, therefore, must not
apply the Franks "substantial preliminary showing" standard so narrowiy as to insulate effectively police perjury and reckless disregard for
the truth. Federal and state courts alike should balance these concerns:
the constitutional requirement of probable cause; the deterrence rationale supporting the exclusionary rule; the practical ability of the defendant in each individual situation to expose the police officer's
malfeasance; and, in particular, the avoidance of police perjury.
The Franks Court cited several commentators 100 who had expressed concern with intentional falsification by police officers in the
warrant affidavit. These commentators, in support of their contentions
that police perjury is widespread, point to the so-called problem of
"dropsy." 101 "Dropsy" cases began to arise shortly after the Supreme
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 215 (1966): "[T)he policman respects the necessity for 'complying' with the arrest laws. His 'compliance,' however, may take the form of post hoc manipulation of the facts rather than before-the-fact behavior." But cf. Mascolo, supra note 77, at 29 n.97
(suggesting that "[O)utright perjury by law enforcement officials is relatively uncommon" ). Several of the cases echo that view. See United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 1967)
("[O]utright peljury by federal agents is not a common occurrence"); United States ex rei. Coffey
v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[W]e do not suppose that outright perjury by FBI agents
is a common occurrence . . . .").
97. Grano, supra note 57, at 409, n.24. Professor Grano offers these examples:
[I]n one case the police admitted that they were not at work at the time their records indicated
they had warned the defendant of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless, they expressed a
willingness to testify consistently with their records. In another case, the police suggested
changing an interrogation record to remove inconsistencies so that the record could be introduced into evidence. After one suppression hearing was lost by a detective who testified that
the defendant had expressed a desire to stop answering questions, other officers .. . expressed disbelief that the detective admitted the fact.
/d q Oaks, supra note 50, at 739-42 (reporting that upper echelon officials admitted that police
officers manipulate facts).
98. Grano, supra note 57, at 411.
99. 438 U.S. at 155-56.
100. /d. at 168, n.7.
101. While Professor Younger was a judge in a New York criminal court he heard a case
which presented the typical "dropsy" scenario. The policman testified that the defendant stepped
out of a doorway at night, saw the officer, dropped a container of marijuana and walked away.
The defendant testified that in light of his narcotics experience, he knew that as long as he kept the
marijuana on his person, out of plain view, the only way the police officer could seize the marijuana and arrest him for possession would be by conducting an illegal search. And the defendant
stated that he realized that any evidence obtained as a product of an illegal search would necessarily be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. The defendant bluntly asserted before the
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Court ruled in Mapp v. Ohio 102 that the Weeks v. United States 103 exclusionary rul~ applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. After Mapp, police officers learned that truthfully reporting the
circumstances of their searches resulted in the exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The police then discovered, according to this argument, that if the defendant drops the
evidence, typically narcotics, to the ground and the officer then arrests
him, the search is "reasonable" and the evidence admissible. The result of the discovery was a marked increase in the number of cases in
which the police testified that immediately prior to the arrest the defendant dropped narcotics to the ground. 104
Presumably, the Supreme Court was aware of the "dropsy" situation and aware also that police peijury constitutes a grave threat to the
integrity of the fourth amendment. The situation in Franks posed a
threat of police peijury analogous to that presented in the "dropsy"
cases. 105 Arguably the Supreme Court intended that the judge who
rules on the motion requesting a veracity hearing would take into account both the surrepticious nature of police perjury and the difficulty
which a defendant will encounter in obtaining evidence suggesting perjury has occurred. The dilemma of the defendant attempting to controvert "dropsy" testimony suggests the difficult situation of a defendant
who attempts to controvert the assertions contained in a facially sufficient warrant. Often the judge who is to rule on the motion will have
little more to weigh than the word of the defendant against the word of
the police officer.
The better view, therefore, is that lower courts should grant the
defendant a veracity hearing when his proffer suggests the real possibility that the police engaged in a course of peijurious behavior which the
initial warrant issuance procedure, because of its ex parte nature, did
not expose. Arguably, the Franks opinion requires only that the defendant convince the judge of the substantial possibility of affiant perjury106 and that his motion is neither frivolous nor a delaying tactic; 107
coun "(t)he last thing I would do is drop the marijuana to the ground." People v. McMuny, 64
Misc. 2d 63, 64, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970).
Professor Younger, in the course of his opinion in the case, observed that when one looks at
the series of "dropsy" cases, it becomes clear that the police are committing peljury, at least in
some of the cases, possibly in nearly all of them. Were the question open in New York, Professor
Younger would have held that the state must have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the search (or lack thereot) and seizure was lawful. That suspicion of police officers'
veracity is the basis for Younger's conclusion that given the ..slightest independent contradiction
of the police officer's testimony or corroboration of the defendant's testimony, the coun should
suppress the evidence." /d. at 67, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
102. 367 u.s. 643 ( 1961 ).
103. 232 u.s. 383 (1914).
104. Younger, supra note 96. The officer's testimony is, for the most pan, identical from case
to case and defense lawyers and prosecutors now refer to this as "dropsy" testimony.
105. See generally Grano, supra note 57.
106. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supponed by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be
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the defendant's evidence need not be conclusive. The quantity of evidence which constitutes a "substantial preliminary showing" in any
given case, of course, will depend on the circumstances of that particular case.
Courts which did permit veracity hearings even prior to Franks
generally required the defendant to introduce factual allegations supporting the charges of police petjury. 108 In United States v. IJunnings, 109 for example, the Second Circuit refused to grant the
defendant a veracity hearing. Although the court did not explain its
determination in precise terms, it concluded that a defendant should be
granted a veracity hearing "only when there has been an initial showing of falsehood or other imposition on the magistrate." 110 That formulation of a preliminary showing standard is too inflexible to
accommodate the delicate balancing process envisioned by the Franks
Court.
The IJunnings court cited Judge Frankel's opinion in United States
v. Halsey, 111 in which a federal district court had concluded that the
quantum of evidence which is required to support a search warrant is
measured by less stringent standards than the evidence required to establish guilt. 112 Once again the standard is not drawn with much precision, but the tenor of the Court's comparison suggests a requirement of
specificity which is so strict that it effectively defeats the purpose of
~Franks: ensuring the good faith of the warrant affiant. Certainly, in
some situations the defendant may not be able to inject more than a
reasonable doubt, because the facts of the situation render any greater
showing impossible.
IV.

McCRA r:

THE QuESTION RESERVED

The Supreme Court in Franks considered the issue- of affiant veracity in regard to the affiant's assertions about his own activities. 113
The Court chose not to consider the "difficult question'' of whether a
court must require disclosure of a confidential informant's identity
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations
must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of
the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses
should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.
438 U.S. at 171. Arguably, the Court's acknowledgement that the defendant may not be able to
furnish affidavits or other reliable statements of witnesses and that the Court would accept in their
stead a satisfactory explanation of their absence, recognizes the potentially difficult situation a
defendant seeking a veracity hearing may confront.
107. /d.
108. See Grano, supra note 57, at 424.
109. 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969).
110. /d. at 840.
Ill. /d., 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
112. 257 F. Supp. at 1007.
I 13. 438 U.S. at 170.
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once the defendant has cast sufficient doubt on the affiant's credibility.114 Thus, lower courts must now grapple with this important, unresolved issue.
Supreme Court precedent has established that an affiant may rely
entirely on the testimony of an undisclosed informant to establish the
probable cause required for the issuance of a warrant. 115 Conceivably,
an officer-affiant may avoid a possible veracity challenge by basing the
entire probable cause assertion on the statements of an undisclosed informant.
In People v. Solimine, 116 the New York Court of Appeals denied
the defendant's requested veracity attack because the defendant sought
to attack the veracity of the police informer rather than of the detective-affiant.117 That holding well depicts the ultimate inefficacy and injustice of a rigid, inflexible preliminary showing standard. If the
defendant is unable to provide sufficient factual support for his allegations of misrepresentation in a warrant affidavit because the informant's identity is not disclosed to him, the fourth amendment protection
afforded by Franks becomes entirely chimerical.
McCray v. Illinois
In McCray v. Illinois, 118 the defendant argued that the trial judge
had erred in refusing to disclose the identity of an informant at a pretrial hearing held to resolve a probable cause challenge to the sufficiency of a warrant. The Court rejected the defendant's argument and
held that, if the judge is convinced of the informant's credibility and of
the reliability of his information, the fourteenth amendment 119 does not
mandate disclosure of the informant's identity "upon mere demand."120 The lower courts must now reread McCray in light of
Franks~ holding and attempt to reconcile the divergent interests represented by the two opinions.
Police arrested McCray for possession of narcotics. At the pretrial
A.

114. /d. An undisclosed informant is one who furnishes the police with information and
thereby gives the police reason to arrest or search. Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause and
the Informer Privilege, 45 DENVER L.J. 399, 400 (1968).
115. United States v. Harris, 403 U .S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also Comment, Informer's Word as the Basisfor
Probable Cause in the Federal Courrs, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965).
116. 18 N.Y.2d 477, 276 N.Y.S.2d 882, 223 N .E.2d 341 (1966).
117 .. The court cited, id. at 479, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 884, 223 N.E.2d at 344; People v. Alfinito, 16
N.Y.2d 181, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 211 N.E.2d 644 (1965).
118. 386 U .S. 300 (1967).
119. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
120. The Court restated its holding in McCroy_in_the Franks opinion. 438 U.S. at 170.
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hearing he stated that until one-half hour before his arrest he was at a
friend's home. Upon leaving the house he walked with a woman for a
short distance; he left the woman and was walking through an alley
when police officers stopped him. The officers did not produce a search
or arrest warrant, but, nevertheless, searched the defendant and found
narcotics. The officers testified that, on the morning of the arrest, they
had spoken with an informant who told them that the defendant was
selling narcotics and had narcotics in his possession. The informant
also allegedly told the officers where they could find the defendant.
The informant, the officers testified, went with the police and pointed
out the defendant before leaving the area. The officers further stated
that when the defendant saw the police car he "hurriedly walked between two buildings." The arresting officer testified that he had known
the informant for about one year, and the informant had on at least
fifteen or sixteen occasions supplied him with narcotics information
which had resulted in numerous arrests and convictions. 121 The officer
even provided the names of those who had been convicted of narcotics
violations based on the informant's tips. When defense counsel inquired of the informant's identity, however, the court sustained the
State's objection. 122
In upholding the trial court's ruling that the informant's identity
could remain undisclosed, the Supreme Court relied principally on the
opinion of Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Burnett, 123 and on Professor Wigmore's description of the
informer's privilege.t 24 The Court acknowledged that allowing the defendant access to the informant's identity exacts too great a price. Law
enforcement officials depend on informants to a considerable extent.
Revelation of the informant's identity compromises his usefulness to
the state and discourages potential informants from offering information to the police.
The McCray Court, however, qualified the informant's privilege.
The Court concluded that when the officer-affiant's credibility is a substantial issue, the magistrate, _prior to issuance of the warrant, may order disclosure. 125 Likewise, when law enforcement officials have
conducted the search without a warrant, the judge hearing the suppression motion may order disclosure of the informant's identity if he
121. A second arresting officer also testified to the reliability of the informant. 386 U.S. at
303-04.
122. 386 U.S. at 302-05. The Supreme Court of Illinois in its consideration of the McCray
case, People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 72, 210 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1963), described the rule of disclosure in Illinois. See also People v. Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d 52,213 N .E.2d 536 (1966); People v. Connie,
34 Ill. 2d 353, 215 N.E.2d 280 (1966); People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966);
People v. Miller, 34 Ill. 2d 527,216 N.E.2d 793 (1966). See also People v. Pitts, 26 Ill. 2d 395, 186
N.E .2d 357 (1962); People v. Parren, 24 Ill. 2d 572, 183 N .E.2d 662 (1962).
123. 42 N.J. 377, 385-88, 201 A.2d 39, 43-45 (1964).
124. 8 J. WtGMORE, EviDENCE§ 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
125. 386 U.S. at 307-08.
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deems it necessary in order to determine the officer's veracity. 126 The·
McCray Court recognized the need for reconciling the defendant's interest in challenging the officer's veracity and the state's interest in protecting its informants. 127 When the affiant-officer's credibility . is
suspect, the Court's opinion in McCray seems to acknowledge the necessity of disclosure. Franks involves a third scenario not addressed in
McCray. In Franks the law enforcement officials had a search warrant
when they conducted their search. When the defendant satisfies the
Franks "substantial preliminary showing" requirement, however, he
has established the same need to verify the affiant's veracity and thu~ to
disclose the informant's identity as existed in McCray.
B.

Reconciling McCray with Franks

A recent Illinois appellate court case illustrates the necessity of
reading the McCray decision in a manner consistent with the Court's
reasoning in Franks. In People v. Anderson, 128 the police officer obtained search warrant on the basis of a statement made by an informant who claimed that he purchased a controlled substance from the
defendant at the defendant's residence. The informant stated that he
observed marijuana while at the defendant's residence and that he witnessed the defendant's sale of cocaine to another unnamed individual.
The police officer then swore that he accompanied the informant to the
defendant's residence and watched the informant enter the house. The
police claimed that when the informant came out of the house he had
cocaine in his possession which the informant alleged he had purchased
from the defendant.
The defendant moved to quash the search warrant and to suppress
the evidence which the police seized. The defendant denied that the
events took place, and sought disclosure of the identity of the informant who was a material witness to the events described in the officer's
complaint for search warrant. The defendant was unable to offer any
conclusive evidence that the officer had lied about the facts reported by
the undisclosed informant, if the informant did in fact even exist.
Judge Trapp, writing for the majority, read Franks narrowly and,
thus, frustrated Franks~ underlying purpose. He asserted that the burden is on "the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjurious statements were the foundation for the grant of
the search warrant." 129 Judge Trapp failed to cite a specific portion of
the Franks opinion to support his assertion, but generally relied on
Franks for support. The Franks Court, however, did not place such a

a

126.
127.
nett, 42
128.
129~

/d.
/d. at 307. The Court adopted the language of Chief Justice Weintraub in State v. BurN.J. 317, 201 A.2d 39 (1964).
74 Ill. App. 3d 363, 392 N.E.2d 938, 30 Ill. Dec. 173 (4th Dist. 1979).
-/d,-at-369,. 392 N.E.2d at 943, 30 Ill. Dec. at 178.
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preliminary burden upon the defendant. Franks did hold that the defendant at a veracity hearing must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard for the truth. 130
Franks does not, however, impose that burden on the defendant in his
initial request for a veracity hearing. Logically, the defendant should
bear the heavier burden only after he receives the hearing. The veracity hearing would be a mere repetitive, insubstantial informality if the
right to obtain the hearing were predicated upon the satisfaction of the
same criteria imposed on the defendant to establish reckless disregard
at the hearing itself. Necessarily, then, the defendant's burden of proof
for obtaining a veracity hearing must be less than a preponderance of
the evidence.
In a dissent in an earlier Illinois Supreme Court case, 131 Justice
Schaefer had recognized the difficult position of the defendant in a
factual scenario such as that presented in People v. Anderson. Justice
Schaeffer cited Justice Traynor's opinion in Priestly v. Superior Court 132
and concluded that when the defendant's conviction turns on whether
probable cause existed for an arrest or search, and when that determination in tum depends upon the existence and reliability of an informer, the court must require disclosure. 133 Otherwise, Justice
Schaeffer argued, the court is incapable of making a rational appraisal,
and the police officer alone conclusively determines the validity of his
own actions. Without disclosure of the informant's identity, the defendant cannot "effectively contest the policeman's opinion as to [the
informant's] reliability." 134
V.

A

PROPOSAL

The superimposition of Franks on the array of cases dealing with
the disclosure of an informant's identity necessitates a compromise to
reconcile two conflicting interests. Analysis of the relevant concerns
suggests acceptable compromises by establishing new standards for the
burden of proof and by allowing in camera disclosure in certain situations.

A.

Burdens of Proof

If the challenged warrant's probable cause assertion is based on
130. 438 U.S. at 156.
131. People v. Durr, 28 Ill. 2d 308, 315, 192 N .E.2d 379, 382 (Schaefer, Klingbiel,
Hershey, JJ., dissenting).
132. 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
133. 28 Ill. 2d at 318, 192 N.E.2d at 384.
134. /d., 192 N.E.2d at 384. In support of the opinions of Justices Traynor and Schaefer see
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945); Wilson v. United States, 59 F .2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp.
639 (W.D. Ky. 1937); United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627 (D.C. Wyo. 1930); Smith v. State, 169
Tenn. 633, 90 S.W. 2d 523 (1936). .
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the word of an undisclosed informant, courts should require in camera 135 disclosure of the informant and grant the defendant a veracity
hearing when two conditions are present: first, when the probable
cause portion of the complaint for search warrant is supported either
entirely or primarily by an undisclosed informant; and second, when
the defendant puts the officer's veracity in issue to the satisfaction of
the judge hearing the motion for a veracity hearing. When the policeman has relied upon an informant, the burden that the court should
place on the defendant attempting to challenge the policeman's veracity is necessarily vague. To be fair and to serve the goals established by
Franks, the burden imposed on the defendant should not be as high
when an informant is involved as· when the policeman relied on his
own first hand knowledge.
The very hearsay nature of the policeman's assertions makes the
defendant's task of casting doubt on the policeman's veracity considerably more burdensome; seldom will the defendant be able to prove that
the policeman misrepresented what the unidentified informant reportedly said. The prosecution should be able to avoid disclosure of the
informant and the veracity hearing only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenge to the officer's veracity is unfounded. The placement of that burden on the prosecution is
consistent with the suggestion of a New York court that the state
should have to prove that the seizure is lawful in a "dropsy" situation.136 As noted earlier in this discussion, the potential for police
abuse in the Franks-McCray situation is fully as real as in the "dropsy"
situation. 137
B.

In Camera Disclosure

Under the test suggested here, in camera disclosure would be re135. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1971) (Harlan, J. , dissenting): "[l]t
would seem that . . . informers could often be brought before the magistrate where he could
assess their credibility for himself. . . . I do not understand the Government to be asserting that
effective law enforcement will often dictate that the identity of informants be kept secret from
federal magistrates themselves."
136. People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970). See note
101 supra. The court's alloc~tion of the burden of proof is echoed to a large extenCin Comment,
Police Peljury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507, 523 (1971):
It is . . . necessary for the courts to adopt procedures calculated to reduce the likelihood that
an officer will be successful by resorting to peljury.
It is suggested that this result can be achieved by closely scrutinizing dropsy testimony
and by requiring the government to prove the legality of a warrantless arrest or search by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N .E.2d 709 (1971), the District Attorney of New York County joined various defendants to argue that the burden of proof in "dropsy"
cases ought to be shifted to the state, in order to alleviate the possibility of peljured police testimony. The court of appeals rejected that argument because it found that the suggested shift in
burden would not alleviate the problem of police peljury, and, therefore, stare decisis mandates
adherence to the present rule.
137. See text accompanying notes 1()()..()5 supra.
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quired only if the probable cause portion of the complaint for search
warrant is supported either entirely or primarily by an undisclosed informant and the defendant had cast sufficient doubt upon the policeman's credibility. The Second Circuit suggested the limitation in a
similar context in a post-McCray case, United States v. Comissiong. 138
In that case, the court considered a challenge to a warrantless arrest
and subsequent search for which probable cause had been established,
at least in part, by the tip of an undisclosed informant. The Second
Circuit, however, found that material other than the information obtained from the informant justified the arrest and search. On that basis,
the court denied disclosure, stating that disclosure of the informant's
identity would be required only when the informant's assertions constitute the "essence or core or main bulk" of the probable cause evidence. 139 Thus, the court correctly acknowledged that the requirement
of independent evidence which would in itself be sufficient to establish
probable cause is an adequate safeguard against fabrication, "although
obviously not a complete one." 140 Other post-McCray decisions have
expounded a rule similar to the Second Circuit's in Comissiong. 141
This comment's proposed test essentially adopts the Comissiong
rule in the context of a request for a veracity hearing; this comment's
"primarily or entirely" language is the equivalent of the Second Circuit's "essence or core or main bulk" language. Although the proposal
offered here applies to judicial review of searches made pursuant to a
search warrant, while Comissiong dealt with a warrantless arrest and
search, the interest vindicated is common to both settings: the integrity
of the warrant requirement. Although the Court has shown a predisposition to presume the constitutionality of searches made pursuant to a
138. 429 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1970). See also A MoDEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 8.03(2) (Tent. Draft No.4, 1971), which would require disclosure when there is not substantial corroboration of the informant's testimony. But that disdosure is not required when the
search was conducted pursuant to a warrant. Thus the Model Code distinguishes between the
warrant and the non-warrant situation.
The Code draws upon -the pre- McCray California approach distinguishing between the warrant and non-warrant situation. Compare Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 CaL 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39
(1958) (arrest and search without a warrant) with People v. Keener, 55 CaL 2d 714, 361 P.2d 587,
12 CaL Rptr. 859 (1961):
If a search is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face and the only objection is that it was
based on information given to a police officer by an unnamed informant, there is substantial
protection against unlawful search and the necessity of applying the exclusionary rule in order to remove the incentive to engage in unlawful searches is not present. The warrant, of
course, is issued by a magistrate, not by a police officer, and will be issued only when the
magistrate is satisfied by the supporting affidavit that there is probable cause.
55 CaL 2d at 722-23, 361 P.2d at 591, 12 CaL Rptr. at 863.
139. 429 F.2d at 838. The court relied heavily on the opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard in
United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1967).
140. 429 F.2d at 839.
141. See United States v. Colon, 419 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Malo, 417 F.2d
1242 (2d Cir. 1969);-united States v. Cappabianca, 398 F.2d 356, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 935, 946 (1968); United States v. Shyvers, 385 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1967).
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warrant, 142 the Franks opinion confirms that the mere fact that a search
was made incident to a warrant does not preclude review of the veracity of warrant affiants. Therefore, the analogy from the warrantless situation to the warrant situation is justifiable in light of Franks.
Ex parte in camera examination of the informant by the court allows the court to evaluate the affiant's credibility without prematurely
or needlessly exposing the informant's identity. Professor Grano has
argued in favor of the in camera proceeding 143 when the judge at the
suppression hearing or the magistrate at the initial warrant issuance
proceeding is unsure whether information o]?tained from a confidential
informant satisfies the probable cause requirement. In that situation,
Grano argues, the judge or magistrate ought to meet in camera with the
informant and examine him. 144 A sealed record of the in camera hearing could preserve the possibility of appellate review. 145
Admittedly, public disclosure of the informant's identity would allow defendant's counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the informant and uncover informant lies that may go undetected in an ex parte
hearing. 146 This argument, however, overlooks the crucial fact that the
issue at the suppression hearing is whether the affiant lied and not
whether the informant lied. 147 The court's concern, therefore, should
be whether the officer-affiant had a reasonable belief in the veracity of
the informant's assertions; the judge should be able to make this determination by listening to the informant's testimony without cross-examination by the defendant.
The proposed accommodation of Franks and McCray is reasonable, for the police may always avoid revelation of the identity of confi142. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). See generally, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.1, at 3 ( 1978).
143. Grano, supra note 57, at 446-47.
144. Professor Grano notes, /d. at 446, that two United States courts of appeals have recommended such an approach in the analogous situation where the trial judge must decide whether to
order disclosure on the issue of guilt. See United States v. Winters, 420 F .2d 523, 524 (3d Cir.
1970); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds,
401 U .S. 481 (1971); United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967).
145. Grano, supra note 57, at 446.
146. /d. at 447. See also LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . .. Has Not
. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 368. "Currently, a number of Illinois trial judges encourage local police to bring informants into chambers for examination by the judge prior to
issuance of a warrant on the basis of a complaint or affidavit by an officer referring to information
from an unidentified informant." But for cases denying in camera examination upon defendant's
request, see People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966); People v. Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d
52, 213 N.E.2d 536 (1966). In Freeman the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the denial on the basis
that there was sufficient evidence that the police officer's testimony was credible to establish probable cause. And see United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967). The sixth amendment
right to confrontation does not have application in this setting. 386 U.S. 300, 313-14, citing
Cooper v. California, 386 U .S. 58,62 n.2 (1966): "Petitioner also presents the contention here that
he was unconstitutionally deprived of the right to confront a witness against him, because the
State did not produce the informant to testify against him. This contention we consider absolutely
devoid of merit."
147. Grano, supra note 57, at 447.
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dential informants by not entirely or primarily relying on those
informants for the probable cause assertion in the warrant application.
Professor Grano has suggested that permitting the state to resist disclosure when the probable cause showing does not rely entirely or primarily on the informant's assertions does not sufficiently protect the fourth
amendment right of the defendant. 148 He asserts that the officer who
would invent a nonexistent informer, or distort information obtained
from an existing informant, would not be reluctant to fabricate sufficient corroboration. 149 When police officers, however; have relied on
sufficient corroboration, or claim to have so relied, for the probable
cause assertion, the proposal suggested here is not applicable. Rather,
the Franks case itself furnishes the procedure for exposing intentional
falsification and reckless disregard for the truth when no informant is
involved. 150
Whether the question concerns the activities and assertions of the
affiant and Franks itself applies, or whether the activities and assertions
of an undisclosed informant and this comment's proposed procedure
applies, the defendant is not without a means to contest the veracity of
the warrant itself. The practical effect of the proposal is this: in those
situations in which the police officer relies upon his own firsthand perceptions, the defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing" of affiant bad faith or falsification before he is granted a veracity
hearing; at the veracity hearing he must prove the same bad faith or
falsification by a preponderance of the evidence before the evidence is
excluded. In the case in which the affiant relies primarily or entirely on
an unidentified informant, the state has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that probable cause actually existed or
the defendant will be entitled to have the judge question the informant
in camera to determine the validity of a veracity hearing request. Regardless of who carried the burden of proof at the suppression hearing,
the defendant will always carry the burden of proving affiant bad faith
or falsification at the veracity hearing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For Franks v. .Delaware to have the effect which the Supreme
Court intended, lower courts must recognize the precise problem re148. /d. at 443, 444.
149. Professor Grano offers this scenario:
(A]n officer may observe known addicts enter certain premises. Although his suspicions are
now aroused, the officer may be powerless to establish further evidence. Hence, the informant is invented and given priority in chronology, with the surveillance now corroborating the
tip. Because the police probably do not waste time conducting searches without at least some
suspicion of criminal activity, the informant probably is invented most often in cases in which
inadequate suspi<Oion could not mature legally into probable cause. Therefore, the corroboration . . . provides no assurance whatsoever of the informant's existence.
/d. at 444.
150. 438 U.S. at 170.
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solved in that case-intentional falsification in the warrant affidavit by
law enforcement officials. Crucial to the realization of the Court's goal
is careful adherence by the lower courts to the Franks "substantial preliminary showing" standard. The Court's requirement that the defendant make a substantial preliminary showing of perjury or reckless
disregard is designed to prevent the transformation of veracity hearings
into mere tools of discovery or delay for the defendant. Of equal importance, however, was the Franks Court's concern that courts not be
unintentional accessori~s to coverups of police bad faith or fabrication.
Lower courts will also be required to confront the question expressly unresolved in Franks: whether a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the informant's identity once a substantial
preliminary showing of falsity has been made. In camera disclosure of
the informant's identity and a veracity hearing should be required
when, first, the probable cause portion of the complaint for search warrant is supported either entirely or primarily by an undisclosed informant; or, second, when the defendant puts the officer's veracity in issue to
the satisfaction of the judge ruling on the motion for a veracity hearing.
The prosecution may in such an instance avoid the in camera disclosure
of the informant by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the challenge to the officer's veracity is unfounded.
The spirit of Franks extends beyond its facts. Lower courts cannot
require veracity hearings when the police officer acts on his own first
hand knowledge and not when he relies upon an informant. Such a
frivolous distinction would be an open invitation to enforcement officials to fabricate statements and even to create nonexistent informants,
thus easily circumventing the possibility of a veracity hearing. The
availability of such a simple subterfuge would make the Franks ruling
meaningless. Fran_ks logically requires a check on the affiant's veracity
both when the affiant states his own beliefs and when he repeats the
allegations of an informant.
PETER ALAN ALCES

